# Intensional T

## Interpretation (1:50)

#### A: The phrase ‘constitutionally protected speech’ is intensional – appealing to the sense of resolution, not extensional appealing to reference of the resolution.

**Goldsworthy 09 explains**, Jeffrey. “Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism.” Philosophy Compass 4/4 (2009): 682–702.

The fourth way is entailed by the **long established distinction between the meaning of a constitution, and its application.**6 **Courts have frequently affirmed** that, **although the meaning of the constitution cannot change except by formal amendment, its application can** legitimately **change as a result of** changes in the **circumstances to which it is applied.** The High Court of Australia has borrowed John Stuart Mill’s terminology of ‘connotation’ and ‘denotation’ to draw the same distinction (today, more **philosophical**ly sophisticated **concepts such as sense and reference, and intension and extension**, **could be used** for the same purpose) (Green 2006)**.** **The** application, denotation, **reference or extension** of a term **is comprised of** all **the things in the world** (or all possible worlds) that **it** denotes or **refers to;** **its** meaning, connotation, **sense or intension consists of the criteria or the function that determine its denotation.** **This distinction can explain** quite **dramatic changes in the operation of a constitution. For example, the Australian Parliament has power to legislate with respect to external affairs**, a term whose original meaning probably included power to implement international treaties that the executive government has ratified.7 **Early in the twentieth century, the** treaty implementing **power was** very **modest**, **because the number of treaties ratified was small**, and the kinds of subject-matters they dealt with were also very limited in number and scope**. Because of a massive increase** **in** all **these** respects, **the power now has a much greater** ambit and practical **impact** than when the constitution was first enacted. **As a result, the shape of Australian federalism** **has dramatically** **changed** **without the meaning of the constitution having been altered.**

#### **These are very different. If I’m friends with Obama, I might say that I’ll do whatever the president asks of me in 2010. If I’m a lover of government, I also might say that I’ll do whatever the government wants in 2010. But I can’t say that I’ll do whatever the government wants, intensional, and whatever the government wants, extensional, since if Trump and Obama ask me to do two opposite things then it’s impossible to do both.**

#### C:

1. **Common Usage and interpretive clarity. Coherent discussions of the value of constitutional provisions for the sake of clarity must appeal back to a grounding in the ‘sense’ of constitutional protection.**

**Green 05**, Christopher. “Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction” Saint Louis University Law Journal. 555-627.

I cannot here give a full defense of the Theory of Original Sinn,35 but let me give a brief initial motivation for the theory. **We might be tempted to think** that it is **only the referents of constitutional expressions-**the particular, actual tangible constitutional consequences with which we must deal-that **matter.** We are practical people, concerned first and foremost with tangible constitutional consequences, and life is short. **If** the **sense is not reducible to** actual, **tangible constitutional consequences, why** should we **care** about it as a constitutional matter**?** The core intuition is this: sense matters because it matters what the Constitution says about the actual, tangible constitutional consequences. **Constitutional sense is critical (a) because it matters what information the constitutional text conveys about the constitutional consequences, (b) because it matters under what mode of presentation the Constitution gives us its consequences, and (c) because it matters what implications the Constitution would have for a range of possible worlds including, but not limited to, the actual one.** **Indeed**, it seems very plausible to me to say more. **Our concern for the constitutional referent,** **as those who live under the authority of the Constitution**, **seems derivative from** our **concern** **for constitutional sense.** Not only is it not the case that we care only about particular actual constitutional consequences to the exclusion of concern for constitutionally borne information, constitutional mode of presentation, and constitutional implications across multiple possible worlds, but our concern for particular, tangible constitutional consequences derives from our concern for such constitutional information and mode of presentation. **We** **care about the constitutional referent because the Constitution, by expressing its sense, conveys information about it and thereby points us to it, forbidding or commanding it.** If we care about the reference, extension, and denotation of constitutional language only because we care about that language's sense, intension, and connotation, then **the Theory of Original Sinn is the natural position to take. The sense of constitutional language is a** sensible **constitutional touchstone and** compelling candidate for **what we should hold fixed when time passes and the world changes. Whatever we hold fixed** **constitutionally** as the world changes **should** be the sort of thing that can **take into account differences in possible worlds, and not be subject to them**: a function from possible worlds to outcomes fits the bill**.** Likewise, **what we keep fixed in the Constitution should, in advance of knowing the facts about how the world may change, give us information about our constitutional outcomes and tell us in what guise or mode of presentation we should look for them.** **Connotation and** **sense accomplish this task**.36

Thus, it’s **a)** key to clarity of advocacy. For example, if the neg fiats amending the constitution the perm is ambiguous, is the government protecting constitutional unprotected speech by affirming?

**b)** key to phil and critical ground about deference in decision making. Criticisms of deference to US legal traditions is important negative ground. Especially important on a topic that is difficult to quantify non-ideological impacts.

**c)** key to resolvability – What the constitution protects is itself subject to contestation. Thus, if the aff defends particular speech that would need to be specified which we can’t do given ambiguity in the legal tradition. The only way to have clear debate is to debate if, on principle, we should protect whatever the constitution happens to protect. That matters – nebulous ground leads to worse engagement and judge intervention to resolve murky issues.

1. Legal Precision. The intensional reading of constitutional protection best accounts for the legal consensus on constitutional terminology.

**Green 05**, Christopher. “Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction” Saint Louis University Law Journal. 555-627.

**The Theory of Original Sinn** **is** in essence **an elaboration of the theory** of fixed meaning and mutable application **once endorsed** (**and never repudiated**) **by the Supreme Court** itself**. Justice Brewer**, writing for the Supreme Court in 1905 **in** **South Carolina v. United States, wrote**: **The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter.** **That which it meant when adopted, it means now.** Being a grant of powers to a government, **its language is general; and, as changes come in social and political life, it embraces in its grasp all new conditions which are within the scope of the powers in terms conferred.** In other words, **while** the **powers** granted **do not change, they apply from generation to generation to all things to which they are in their nature applicable.** This in no manner abridges the fact of its changeless nature and meaning. 54 Through Justice **Sutherland**, the Court **elaborated** on the same idea while referring to a statute in its 1926 decision, Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States. 55 The Court appealed to the "universal law of language," which allows that "**words do not change their meaning; but the application of words grows and expands.**" 56 Justice Sutherland said much the same thing about the Constitution, writing for the Court later in 1926, in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co. The Court said: [W]hile the meaning of constitutional guaranties [sic] never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. **In a changing world it is impossible that it should be otherwise**.... [A] degree of **elasticity is** thus **imparted, not to the meaning, but to the application of constitutional principles .** ... 57 **The** South Carolina and Euclid **doctrine** of constitutional change **has not** been invoked much recently by the Supreme Court, but it has not **been repudiated.**5 8 It is instructive to note that some of the critics of South Carolina's doctrine on constitutional change have explicitly embraced a theory of language that denies any room for Fregean sense, as distinct from reference. After quoting the formulation above, Jacobus tenBroek condemns it because "a word or expression possesses no intrinsic significance; the meaning of a word or expression is the thing or things to which it refers., 59 He later stresses, "The meaning of terms cannot be changeless if their application is extensible because their meaning is not only determined by, but is the extent of their application." 60 TenBroek's constitutional universe contains only reference, extension, and denotation: he allows only a collection of constitutional consequences, and no textually expressed meaning that might be stable while circumstances change. He has no room for sense, intension, or connotation. Insofar as tenBroek's position follows, as I think it does, from his rejection of any notion of the sense of a word (as distinguished from its referent), it is plain that the sense-reference distinction or its kin are critical to maintaining the view of South Carolina.

Legal precision grounded in court precedent key. The first amendment is vague and only given substance by interpretation, means fixed means of interpretation is key to limits. Also means we control the internal link to the relevancy of predictability. Precision is a gateway to assessing what forms of predictability are admissible.

Jake **Nebel** [Rhodes scholar and TOC semi-finalist – currently at Oxford and graduated from Princeton] “Jake Nebel on Specifying Just Governments.” http://vbriefly.com/2014/12/19/jake-nebel-on-specifying-just-governments/This is good evidence because ordinary speakers have an implicit (but not infallible) mastery over the language in which the resolution is stated. **The resolution is stated in English, not in some special debate-specific dialect** of English. **Facts of usage constrain interpretation. The existential interpretation is not even**, as I see it, **eligible**. So **its pragmatic benefits are irrelevant.** Compare: **I think it would be better if the res**olution **were**, **“It is not the case that just governments** ought to …” **But that’s not the res**olution, so **it’s not even** an **eligible** interpretation **in a T debate.** (Here I assume a controversial view about whether pragmatic benefits can justify a semantically inadequate interpretation of the resolution. I cannot defend this view here, but I welcome questions and objections in the comments to be addressed in a later article.)

## Voter

[Insert T voter]

## Frontlines

### Vagueness

**Green 05**, Christopher. “Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction” Saint Louis University Law Journal. 555-627.

**How**ever, a sketch of my theory of **vagueness** and how it might **apply to the law** **should be helpful.** We should distinguish three different phenomena related to whether an instance falls under a concept: (a) ignorance about where the boundaries of a concept lie; (b) intermediacy in the application of a concept, so that it applies only somewhat, neither applying to the instance completely nor not applying to the instance at all; and (c) indeterminacy about whether a concept applies to an instance, so that there is no right answer to whether the concept applies. My view of vagueness, as a general matter, is this: we can explain away the appearance of indeterminacy as a mixture of ignorance and intermediacy. Expressions might only partially apply to some instances, and we might not know whether expressions apply to particular instances, but there are no predicates for which there is no answer about whether, and to what extent, they apply. Consider an instance of vagueness: how many hairs does Harry need to lose to be bald? Suppose that if he had 100,000 hairs on his head, he would clearly not be bald, and if he had none, he would clearly be bald. Imagine plucking out Harry's hair one by one: a sequence of cases from 100,000 hairs down to 0. Where is the dividing line where baldness begins? I would say that at some point, it is right to say that Harry begins to be a little bit bald. He goes from being not bald at all to being bald to approximately degree I/n, where n is the number of hairs in the transition stage. We do not know exactly which hair's removal would make the difference-this is where ignorance fits into my story-but this ignorance is not a problem, because the hair only marks the difference between being bald to degree 0 and being bald to degree 1/n for fairly large n. To apply my theory of vagueness to the law, we would need to decide what to do with the two phenomena to which I would reduce it: intermediacy and ignorance. The law could recognize intermediacy, or partial constitutionality, in different ways. It is not clear what courts should do in cases where it seems that an action is only somewhat constitutional-neither fully allowed nor fully forbidden. One way to perform such baby-splitting is through the use of partial liability rules, rather than property rules.39 In a case of partial constitutionality, an actor could be made to pay some cost for its actions, but not as much as in a case of fully unconstitutional behavior. Alternatively, the law might continue to draw sharp boundaries around its concepts, but recognize that the rules it implements do not precisely replicate the constitutional categories: they implement the Constitution, rather than simply enforcing it.4° There may be important elements, for this reason and for many others, for which constitutional law must go beyond constitutional interpretation; my concern here is chiefly with interpretation. The second phenomenon to which I would reduce vagueness, besides intermediacy, is ignorance. Ignorance of the law is, of course, a common phenomenon. Ignorance is why we have to have lawyers and academics, and why constitutional interpretation is hard work. We should not be surprised that we are constitutionally ignorant; indeed, there would be no need for a theory of constitutional interpretation if we could always easily know the answers to interpretive questions. The historical work necessary to discern what sense was expressed by an expression can be substantial-it can be as hard as learning a foreign language. Further, it can also be hard to find out the reference-yielding facts. The Theory of Original Sinn leaves ample room for constitutional ignorance, but this fact renders the theory plausible, not useless.41

### More intenisonal is precise args

#### Internal Coherence

**Green 05**, Christopher. “Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction” Saint Louis University Law Journal. 555-627.

In a work in progress, I consider one way to use **the Constitution's self-referring clauses** (the clauses **which use "this Constitution"** or "here" or "now") to **construct an argument that, if we agree with the Constitution's view of itself, we should think of it as a historically embodied textual assertion of authority, and that such a constitutional ontology would point toward some form of originalist textualism** as the proper theory of constitutional law (if we agree with that assertion of authority)**.** For a similar argument, produced independently of my own views, see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1127-31 (2003). "The document itself... appears to prescribe textualism (in some form or another) as the proper mode of interpretation and application of the Constitution by those holding office under it." Id. at 1128 (arguing from the Supremacy Clause). But here, I am mainly concerned to give an explanation of my view and distinguish it from other prominent theories in a way that can highlight some problems with those rivals.

extension [grammar first]:

Extend Nebel – precision comes first since usage of language is a side constraint on legitimacy of T interps – and otherwise we could debate another topic or a blatantly ungrammatical view of the res. We understand the meaning of the res only within the context of English. This comes prior to issues of fairness and education and o/w since it’s is specific to the function of T in rounds – your responses are based on a conflation. You only justify changing the topic or it being bad that the res was this one, not your CI, which means you have no offense. **NEBEL**[[1]](#footnote-1)**:** One reason why LDers may be suspicious of my view is because they see topicality as just another theory argument. But unlike other theory arguments, **topicality** involves two “interpretations.” The first is an interpretation, in the ordinary sense of the word, of the resolution or of some part of it. The second **is a *rule***—namely, that **the aff**irmative **must defend the res**olution.[2](http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/#fn2) If we don’t distinguish between these two interpretations, then the negative’s view is merely that the affirmative must defend whatever proposition they think should be debated, not because it is the proposition expressed by the resolution, but rather because it would be good to debate. This failure to see **what is distinctive about** Topicality leads quickly to the pragmatic approach, by ignoring what the interpretation is supposed to be an interpretation *of*. By contrast, **the topicality rule**—i.e., that the affirmative must defend the resolution—**justifies the semantic approach**. This rule is justified by appeals to fairness and education: **it would be unfair to expect the neg**ative **to prep**are **against anything other than the res**olution, because **that is the only mutually acceptable basis for prep**aration; **the educational benefits** that are unique to debate **stem from clash** focused **on a proposition determined beforehand**. The inference to the priority of semantic considerations is simple. Consider the following argument: We ought to debate the resolution. The resolution means X. Therefore, We ought to debate X. The first premise is just the topicality rule. The second premise is that X is the semantically correct interpretation. **Pragmatic considerations** for or against X do not, in themselves, support or deny this second premise. They might **show that it would be better** or worse***if* the resolution meant X, but** **sentences do not** in general **mean what it would be best for them to mean**. At best, pragmatic considerations may show that we should debate some proposition other than the resolution. **They are** (if anything) **reasons to *change* the topic, contrary to the topicality rule**. Pragmatic considerations must, therefore, be weighed against the justifications for the topicality rule, *not* against the semantic considerations: they are objections to the first premise, not the second premise, in the argument above.

Nebel says I also control the internal link to fairness and education. And more reasons grammatical accuracy also controls the strongest internal link to fairness:

a) Internalizing a norm that debate is solely determined by pragmatic concerns like education or fairness would literally collapse the activity [especially key given your util fwk]. **NEBEL**[[2]](#footnote-2)**:** One way admits that such pragmatic considerations are relevant—i.e., they are reasons to change the topic—but holds that they are outweighed by the reasons for the topicality rule**. It would be better if everyone debated the res**olution as worded, **whatever it is**, **than if everyone debated what**ever **subtle variation** on the resolution **they favored**. Affirmatives would unfairly abuse (and have already abused) the entitlement to choose their own unpredictable adventure, and negatives would respond (and have already responded) with strategies that are designed to avoid clash—including **a**n essentially **vigilantist approach to topicality** in which **debaters enforce their own pet resolutions** on an arbitrary, round-by-round basis. Think here of the utilitarian case for internalizing rules against lying, murder, and other intuitively wrong acts. As the great utilitarian Henry Sidgwick argued, **wellbeing is maximized not by everyone doing what they think maximizes** wellbeing, **but rather** (in general) **by people sticking to the rules of common sense** morality. Otherwise, **people are more likely to act on mistaken** utility **calculations and engage in self-serving violations** of useful rules, thereby **undermining** social practices that promote **wellbeing** in the long run. That is exactly what happens if we reject the topicality rule in favor of direct appeals to pragmatic considerations. **Sticking to a rule** that applies **regardless of** the topic, of the debaters’ **preferred variations** on the topic, **and** of debaters’ familiarity with **the national circuit’s flavor of the week**, **avoids these problems.**

Answers back T interps that talk about pragmatic considerations e.g. ground, educational benefits like real world, or reciprocity, because even if its bad ground or education, you being allowed to change the topic is even worse.

b) It’s a jurisdiction question – so long as you believe the goal of T is to constrain debate to the topic, the pragmatic view fails. **NEBEL**[[3]](#footnote-3)**:** Here is a third kind of response to the view that we should directly appeal to pragmatic considerations when evaluating topicality. This view justifies debating propositions that are completely irrelevant to the resolution but are much better to debate. **Once you say that pragmatic benefits** can **justify debating a proposition that isn’t** really **what the res**olution **means**, or that the resolution means whatever it would be best for it to mean, **there is no principled way of requiring any** particular **threshold of similarity** in order to be an eligible interpretation of the resolution. This means that the pragmatic approach **justifies affirmatives that have nothing to do with the res**olution. Of course some see no problem with non-topical affirmatives whose impacts outweigh the reasons to debate the resolution. But suppose you want a *principled* response to such strategies. You have one if **you take seriously the idea that the debate should be about the res**olution, and **the idea that the proposition** expressed by the resolution **is independent of what** proposition **would be best to debate**. Without a commitment to debating the proposition that the resolution actually means, I don’t think there is a principled response to such strategies, as I discuss below.

c) Pragmatic interpretations of topicality assume consent, which I do not give. I want us to debate the res as stated. **NEBEL**[[4]](#footnote-4)**:** A second strategy denies that such pragmatic benefits are relevant. This strategy is more deontological. One version of this strategy appeals to the importance of consent or agreement. **Suppose that you give your opponents** prior **notice that you’ll be affirming** the **Sept**ember/**Oct**ober 2012 resolution instead of the current one. There is a sense in which **your affirmation** of that resolution **is now predictable**: your opponents know, or are in a position to know, what you will be defending. And suppose that **the older resolution is conducive to better** (i.e., more fair and more educational) **debate. Still, it’s unfair** of you **to expect your opponents to follow suit**. Why? **Because they didn’t *agree***to debate that topic. **They registered for a tournament** whose invitation specified the current resolution, **not the** Sept/Oct 2012 resolution or a **free-for-all**. The “social contract” argument for topicality holds that **accepting a tournament invitation constitutes** implicit **consent to** debate **the specified topic**. This claim might be contested, depending on what constitutes implicit consent. What is less contestable is this: given that *some* proposition must be debated in each round and that the tournament has specified a resolution, no one can reasonably reject a principle that requires everyone to debate the announced resolution as worded. This appeals to Scanlon’s contractualism. Someone who wishes to debate only the announced resolution has a strong claim against changing the topic, and no one has a stronger claim against debating the announced resolution (ignoring, for now, some possible exceptions to be discussed in the next subsection). So it is unfair to expect your opponent to debate anything other than the announced resolution. This unfairness is a constraint on the pursuit of education or other goods: **it wrongs and is unjustifiable to your opponent.**

Outweighs your justifications – our agreement to engage in this topic is *at least* mutual, but the new quasi-topic you’re endorsing is definitely not. *Deontology means topicality comes first since we have both registered at the tournament promising to debate the topic-if you don’t defend the topic you are breaking your promise to the tournament directors which is a perfect duty since to break a promise is to will breaking it and the nonexistence of promises to begin with.*

AT pragmatic interps good [overall]:

1) the onus is on you to prove debate-speak is somehow different from normal English interpretation, and we have good evidence to think it’s not. **NEBEL**[[5]](#footnote-5)**:** But even if Kupferbreg is right that debate is its own context, **it does not follow that conduciveness to good debate determines what the resolution means.** Kupferbreg appeals to the consensus of linguists that words can be ambiguous. That is obvious. But **linguists require *evidence* of ambiguity** before they accept that a word is ambiguous. That is why they posit empirical tests of ambiguity (Zwicky and Sadock 1975). Many linguists and philosophers of language are guided by the maxim, “Avoid multiplying senses beyond necessity.” **A debater appealing to the technical context of debate would need empirical evidence** that **the expression has a debate-specific, technical meaning.** Without this evidence, **we should assume that the words** in the resolution **are used in their ordinary senses** (or, in certain obvious cases, in the technical sense of some academic field). Moreover, **it is unlikely that NSDA** LD topic committee **would use words** **in** unconventional **ways** that could **only** be **understood by** application of debate-specific standards—especially standards that are used by **a tiny minority of LD debaters**, in the grand scheme of things.[13](http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/#fn13) I don’t want to put too much weight on what the topic committee thinks, because I have no idea what they think, and different members probably think different things about resolutional interpretation. My point is just that the ambiguity hypothesis is, without much further evidence, just a hypothesis, and that it is*prima facie* unlikely that resolutions are written not in ordinary English but rather in **some technical dialect of English which the vast majority of debaters and coaches** (i.e., **those who primarily compete on local circuits**) **do not speak.**

The “example of the resolution” view of topicality fails as well if I win my semantic argument. **NEBEL**[[6]](#footnote-6)**:** Perhaps I have misunderstood the parametric approach, by taking the resolution to be a boundary on the wrong sorts of objects. Let’s consider a different version of the parametric view. On this view, **the resolution** is a **boundary on a set of *examples***. More specifically, these examples are agent-action pairs—e.g., the U.S. doing something, the UK doing something, etc., where “something” is a way in which that agent could require employers to pay a living wage. The affirmative may pick an example within that set as their advocacy, and the question of topicality is just which examples belong in the set. There is a problem with this view, however. It p**resupposes** what I earlier called **the *existential* interpretation** of the topic. **If the resolution said** (or meant), “**Some just governments** ought to . . . ,” **then it would be clearly permissible**, if not obligatory, **for the affirmative to specify** a particular just government. But **if** the resolution’s **“just governments” is instead a generic**, then **it’s unclear why it should be legit**imate **for the aff**irmative to specify a particular government. To see why this is suspicious, **suppose that the res**olution **stated**, “**All just governments ought to** . . . .” I hope everyone would agree that **one couldn’t affirm by specifying** a single government or even a few governments, *even if those are examples of just governments requiring employers to pay a living wage*. This is because **universal generalizations are not affirmed by a single** witnessing **instance.** Nor would it be persuasive to suggest that although the resolution is worded as a universal or generic generalization, we should ignore that feature because it is undesirable for debate. The same goes for generic generalizations. So it should be no more legitimate for the affirmative to specify a particular example on a generic resolution than it is on a universal one. At the very least, this is a reason why the version of the parametric approach under consideration cannot be applied to resolutions regardless of their wording: **the resolution’s semantics comes first.**

AT empirical ground:

1. turn: specifying a single country can avoid key ground by choosing an extreme with no disadvantages and irrefutable empirics, exploding aff ground and destroying any room for neg disads since there are 190+ countries. My limit is better – you can spec employers, just not location.

AT Debate Norms

A) this would imply we should not innovate at TOC. Creativity is good, especially at TOC. b) topic precedence is bad because it reintrenches squo. You should always have to win what debaters do is good, not just that we should do the same thing everyone else is doing. This is a pernicious herd mentality. C) prefer topic lit and constituonal lit to define predictability. Far more qualified and allows us to avoid substantive problems. D) predictability is at most necessary but insufficient for topicality. The fact I always read the same aff on every topic does not make it a topical aff.

AT common usage:

turn: Many policy debate theorists have concluded that semantics takes lexical priority over pragmatic concerns – this view is a pretty well-developed norm. **NEBEL**[[7]](#footnote-7)**:** My view probably seems obvious to some people and incoherent to others. Outsiders to national circuit LD may find it ridiculous that anyone would find it necessary to defend it at such length. But some circuit LDers may think that my view rests on a conceptual confusion about topicality. **Argumentation theorists**, however, **have defended the priority of semantics in the context of CEDA**(Murphy 1994), **NPDA** (Merrell 2015), **and NFA LD**(Diers 2010) debate. Why should the view be coherent in these contexts but not in high school LD? Or do these authors simply fail to understand what topicality means? I don’t think that either hypothesis is very credible.

**Murphy, Merrell, and Diers argue that pragmatic considerations are circular, unverifiable, self-undermining, subjective, non-unique, and ungrounded in argumentation theory.**

Also pragmatic concerns are not irrelevant under my interp – they are just lexically inferior to semantics. If two interps both accord with the text, then we can use standards like ground as the tiebreaker.

1. [ibid] but article is entitled “The Priority of Resolutional Semantics.” 2/20/15 http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/ [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. [ibid] [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. [ibid] [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. [ibid] [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. [ibid] [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. [ibid] [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. [ibid] but article is entitled “The Priority of Resolutional Semantics.” 2/20/15 http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/ [↑](#footnote-ref-7)